Foreign Exchange: Fareed Zackaria Talks with Qubad Talabany
Fareed Zakaria: As the situation in much of Iraq grows increasingly unstable and fractious, the semi-autonomous oil-rich Kurdish region in the north is an area of relative clam and prosperity. What will the disintegration of Iraq either by civil war or by design mean for the people and success of Iraqi Kurdistan? With us to discuss this is Qubad Talabany, the US Representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Qubad let me ask you; when one looks at Iraq right now it appears as though there is a level of sectarian violence and tension that is increasing day-by-day, week-by-week. In other words, the trend line is very much in the wrong direction; am I wrong?
Qubad Talabany: I don’t think you’re entirely wrong Fareed; the fact that Iraq really hasn’t developed a stable and sound and effective central government since the ousting of Saddam Hussein has really polarized the society where the different communities are feeling much more comfortable in being aligned with the political parties or their religious groups or the--the mosques of their affiliation and--and this has somewhat made it more difficult and has somewhat increased the tensions between the different sectarian and ethnic groups in the country.
Fareed Zakaria: Now you guys in Kurdistan squabbled a lot ten years ago and there were pitched battles and it seemed as though there was a kind of a minor low-grade civil war taking place in Kurdistan. What ended it?
Qubad Talabany: Well I think--and that’s--and I’m very glad that you raised this point because a lot of similarities can be pointed to what’s going on in the rest of Iraq at the moment. If--if you remember in ’91 we came down from the mountains; we encompassed this land called Kurdistan for the first time; we had been fighting for it for so long. With the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from that region we--we started to administer the region. It was a fledgling Administration that really didn’t have the political maturity to be able to sustain the coalition government that we formed, so there was a civil war that broke out between the two major political parties in Kurdistan and this war waged on for many years. It was only when we realized that we are missing a golden opportunity by fighting each other that--that we could miss out on the--on the great price of living within a federal democracy in a Saddam-free Iraq. The United States stepped in; they helped broker a peace between the two sides. It took many years even after that peace was broken for the trust to really develop between the two warring factions in--in Kurdistan. But today we’re seeing the byproduct of that intervention on the US part. We’re seeing a stable and prosperous Kurdistan region where the parties have their rivalries, have their differences, but have really put the majority of those differences aside, have unified ranks and are working together to really provide the best they can for the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Fareed Zakaria: All right; so now let’s look at the differences. You--there was no great sectarian difference. You were all Kurds. You lived under the shadow of US protection; that is to say that if the United States had withdrawn the no-flight zone. Saddam’s troops would have gone in and massacred you. You needed the stability because you needed money and you needed you know--whether it was all US aid or oil revenues. When I look at Iraq right now I see deep sectarian divisions. There is no sense that the United States is really effectively being able to protect anyone other than you know the people in the green zone and the feeling is that the oil revenues are there for them to take anyway; so--so the oil revenues have become part of the problem because they are the spoils which each side is vying for. That seems--sounds much more hopeless.
Qubad Talabany: The stakes are much higher in Iraq; the complications are greater. I think the regional interference is as much or possibly greater than it was in [inaudible] but what’s similar is--is the political immaturity that exists in Baghdad--that existed in Kurdistan--the ability to administer and govern effectively is what’s really lacking in--in Baghdad today.
Fareed Zakaria: And why was it--why was the United States able to broker that deal because God knows we’ve been trying to broker a deal in Baghdad. We--we tried push the--the Shia parties to make certain concessions; we’ve tried to push the Sunni groups to--to reach out to the insurgency and reign in the violence. Neither side is biting.
Qubad Talabany: The--the sides have to come to a realization that they will lose before they can actually come to the table and sit down and negotiate. We came to that realization in Kurdistan. We realized that we were going to lose a golden opportunity and so we did; we put our differences aside and--and albeit there weren't the--the kinds of divisions that we’re seeing in Iraq today. There were a lot of tensions that did go back for several decades between the two--the two main parties. What we--what we’re seeing in Iraq is very unfortunate and tragic but to--if we can look at the complications the problems of Iraq today are not today’s problems. They’re problems of hundreds if not a thousand or so years ago that we’re seeing turn into reality in Iraq today and it’s coming to a realization that the complexity of the situation in Iraq and the deep sectarian and--and ethnic division that exists in Iraq makes it very difficult for us to come up with a blanket policy that will please the Sunnis, please the Shiites, please the Kurds--at the same time.
Fareed Zakaria: Everybody agrees that the only way you’re going to get a--some succession or--or diminution of the violence is some kind of a political deal. Everybody knows what the political deal is going to have to look like--substantial autonomy for the regions, some sharing of the oil revenues, some kind of amnesty so that everyone involved in the killings can be rehabilitated; there is no indication that there is much movement on these issues--yes, one or two laws pass here and there but a substantial national reconciliation on the lines of a South Africa or something like that seems nowhere in the cards. How do we get from here to there?
Qubad Talabany: Well first and foremost the violence has to stop. It’s--it’s going to be very difficult to carry out a--a national reconciliation, a truth in reconciliation plan as in--as in what happened in South Africa while there is a war going on, while there is the blood-letting and the violence that we’re seeing today in the country. And again this comes back to the ability of the leadership in Iraq, the leadership of the different communities, the leadership of the different tribes and of the religious groups to be able to be held accountable for the actions of their--.
Fareed Zakaria: But how do you stop the violence? People are trying and it’s decentralized at this point and as you pointed out the--the weaker the Iraqi state the more people withdraw to these local regional militias; in fact sometimes to just street gangs. There are reports now that in places like Basra you--it’s--it’s--people are pledging their allegiance to you know--to almost neighborhood by neighborhood militias. How on earth do you stop this?
Qubad Talabany: Well there’s--I don’t really have the answer to that to be honest with you, Fareed. I’ve been--I’ve--
Fareed Zakaria: If you did you’d be in Baghdad. [Laughs]
Qubad Talabany: I’d be you know a lot happier and I think the world would be a lot safer but we have to come to the realization that today Baghdad is the prize which is why everybody is fighting for Baghdad. If we reduce that prize and the importance of that prize and--and give people a stake in governing their own affairs, their own regions, their--their own territories, where they can raise their own local police and law enforcement units, without the imposition of Baghdad then I think we--we have a much better chance of success. I’m not saying that--that will be easy because we have to overcome corruption, nepotism, and--and warlord(ism) in the region.
Fareed Zakaria: Now this is--this sort of plays into a certain Kurdish agenda which is of course to have a strong--stronger local and regional grouping, which may be inevitable, it may be the way of the future but does it not produce an intractable problem which is that the Sunni will not stop fighting unless there is a deal on oil revenues because under your plan it all sounds nice except that the Sunnis get no oil, right. And so unless you have some deal in place devolving power to the--to the regions will insure that one of these three groups--the Sunnis will fight to the bitter end because they know what--what that will mean in the absence of an oil--oil revenue sharing deal.
Qubad Talabany: I have to disagree with you there, Fareed because our deal includes the Sunnis in--in them receiving their fair share of the oil revenues. We have to come up with the real deal that needs to be made is coming up with a formula with a mechanism that equitably distributes the oil revenues of the country.
Fareed Zakaria: Right; but that--and that the Sunnis do not trust is in place.
Qubad Talabany: They do not trust at this point and they won't trust with--with a centralized government in Baghdad. There has to be a lot of international involvement whether it’s World Bank oversight or--or some other international body to oversee the distribution of Iraq’s oil revenues to make sure that--that it’s not based on--that it’s based on a per-capita and a proportionate system that makes people feel assured. At the moment, insecurities are high; everyone is insecure. The Sunnis are insecure, the Shias are insecure--.
Fareed Zakaria: But this is auditory again--how do we make it happen? Why is that what you’re describing which is eminently sensible is not something that--that the Shia majority in Parliament will accept?
Qubad Talabany: We have to get them to understand; we have to--again it comes back to political maturity and we--I don’t know how we do it but--but the--the less insecure they get the more--the more all sides will realize that we can come up with a framework. There is enough oil to be distributed in this country and this is what we have to continue to--to let people know; this country is a potentially very rich and powerful country and there is enough to go around to make the Sunnis happy, to make the Kurds happy, to make the Shiites happy but what we need is a mechanism in place and the mechanism has to be an Iraqi mechanism with a lot of international oversight to give people the security and--and the guarantees that it will be managed effectively.
Fareed Zakaria: All right; if all this doesn’t happen do you want American troops in Kurdistan--your--the President of Iraq who is a Kurd who also happens to be your father has said publicly for the first time in the last few months that he would welcome American--an American base; is that a formal offer to the United States?
Qubad Talabany: We’ve constantly offered this to the United States formally and informally. We think that--that having the American troops in the Kurdistan region will--will serve the United States. It’s--it’s the one part of--of the Middle East I would say--certainly of Iraq--that is overwhelmingly pro-American--that wants American troops there.
Fareed Zakaria: Probably Bush--I think of it as one place that Bush would have done well in this last election is if he had gotten votes in Kurdistan.
Qubad Talabany: [Laughs] Well we--people are grateful to the President because he led this effort to liberate us and to oust Saddam and I think that’s--that’s very recognizable.
Fareed Zakaria: Do you think it will happen?
Qubad Talabany: Do I think the Americans will have troops in Iraq--in Kurdistan? I think it will; I think it will be--it will be a mistake for them not to take up this offer.
Fareed Zakaria: All right; if we’re going to protect the shining example of--of modernity and democracy do you think that the situation in Kurdistan in terms of democracy and openness is going to get better? Right now the place runs as essentially two one-party [states] carved out and to be--to--to prosper in either part of the--Kurdistan you have to belong, you have to have political allegiance to one of the two parties--one of which you represent. That’s--one hopes that it--Kurdistan is going to get more democratic than that.
Qubad Talabany: Right; and--and we’re constantly trying to democratize the Kurdistan region. And this is why we need American involvement to help us along this way. We have done very well to come from where we did in ’92 to where we are today--where we have a unified Kurdistan regional government where both political parties are fully engaged and the Cabinet Ministries are--it’s a coalition government in the Kurdistan region but we have to increase our level of civil society, improve on our level of civic education and really open our society up a lot more. We--we are an example when you compare us to the rest of Iraq but if you compare us to Europe and other places we have a long way to go. And we understand that and our leadership understands that which is why we think it would be a travesty if there was a premature withdrawal from Iraq and there was no guarantees to protect the--the really developing civil society in the Kurdistan region. Here is a region in the heart of the Islamic Middle East that has a real semblance of hope; we--we jokingly say because of and despite of US foreign policy we are where are today and--and we really urge that--that people not lose sight of what’s emerging in Kurdistan. Instead of leaving us to our own devices help us to turn into a fully functioning democracy and I think the will on the part of the leadership of Kurdistan is there. We just need to partner with the United States and with others in the international community to help us get there.
Fareed Zakaria: Qubad Talabany, thank you very much.
the original site is http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc120107FZ.html
We have copied this interview from there
