Morocco's 2007 Elections

Samir Ben-Layashi - 12/21/2007
This article discusses the social and political context of Morocco's 2007 parliamentary elections, which brought surprising results. It attempts to explain why the moderate Islamic party, the PJD, did not achieve an overwhelming victory as was expected. It also explores why the formerly undefeatable socialist party, the USFP, lost popularity. Finally, it examines the remarkable comeback of the historically conservative Independent Party, the IP. The article points out that while the PJD may have lost on the national scale, it won in most of the big cites--the political, economic, and intellectual capitals of Morocco. The IP, on the other hand, succeeded mainly in the rural areas, where voting is largely influenced by state propaganda, notables, and family alliances.

The end of summer 2007 marked three important events in Morocco: the beginning of the academic school year, Ramadan, and elections for the lower chamber of parliament.[1]

While under normal conditions elections alone are not a cause of concern for citizens, the new school year and Ramadan presented a considerable financial burden to the average Moroccan family. Parents deliberated between heading to the bookstores to buy school supplies for their children and going to the markets to buy the traditional Ramadan fare for iftar (the point at which the fast is broken) and suhur (the last meal before the fast).[2] Worse, the prices of basic food items--sugar, tea, flour, cooking oil, and the traditional khubz bread--gradually increased. The population grew irritable; a few sporadic (but spontaneous) demonstrations were reported, prompting the state to react quickly with new subsidies for bread.[3] While Moroccans were more concerned with the price of bread than that of gasoline, the increase in gas prices resulted in a general strike against the public transportation system.[4]

All summer long, Morocco's national television station, RTM, attempted to persuade the MRE (Marocains résidant à l'étranger or Moroccans residing abroad) to send remittances to their families, to invest in Morocco, and even to come back "home." It is important to note that there exists a second generation of Moroccans, which was both born and resides abroad. First generation Moroccans and recent Moroccan immigrants who still hold their Moroccan passports are denied the right to vote in Moroccan elections from their new countries of residence. A number of Moroccan NGOs in France have been critical of this policy and requested the right for Moroccan citizens to participate in Moroccan parliamentary elections by casting ballots from the Moroccan consulate in France.[5] Morocco has yet to respond to their request but in the meantime has continued its campaign to persuade Moroccan expatriates to invest in the country and to send money to their families there.

From mid-August 2007, the state began to promote the elections scheduled for September 7. As the elections neared, RTM was flooded with commercials urging youth to fulfill their "national and social duty." While prior to this, official discourse had qualified the voting as a "national" duty, now for the first time it was also being referred to as a "social" obligation. In line with this, the main theme of the TV talk-show Hiwar, hosted by the popular Mustafa Alawi, became the elections and the youth's national conscience. In addition, RTM, along with the Interior Ministry, artists, local organizations, members of civil society, and other well-known figures, led a national campaign to mobilize voters around the kingdom, especially in the rural areas.

In an effort to reach out to the people and to connect the capital, Rabat, with the citizens of remote villages, a traveling caravan was organized by the 2007 Daba association (daba meaning "now" in Moroccan dialect), which trekked across the entire country. Notably, for the first time a written Tamazight (Berber) and colloquial Arabic Darija were used to address a large part of the population that does not understand literary Arabic or French. Customarily, for such official events as election campaigning, the state has either used French or literary Arabic; Tamazight and Darija have been exclusively reserved for folkloric themes, popular festivities, and soap operas.

Youth and old oppositionists of Hassan II's regime collaborated with Moroccan rap artists to declare: "The old time is over, now we have to act, we have to vote," alluding to the previous autocratic ancient régime of Hassan II. On the eve of the elections, both the official and the independent press managed to create an impression that that the rate of participation in the elections was expected to reach about 90 percent and that the contestable winner would be the Islamic party, the PJD (the Justice and Development Party, or Hizb al-Adala wa-Tanmiyya). Even on the eve of the elections, the French press, which showed increased interest in the Moroccan elections, anticipated a huge victory for the PJD.[6]

Street polls indicated the same projections: The PJD was likely to increase its representation in parliament from 42 of 325 seats to 70 or more.[7] Yet other voices in the mainstream press,[8] civil society (2007 Daba), as well as some anti-mainstream newspapers--such as Le Monde Amazigh,the organof the Cultural Amazigh (Berber) Movement--predicted a very low voter turnout.[9] After all, it was the predicted low voter turnout that prompted 2007 Daba to organize the "citizenship caravan"--equipped with a radio and TV station--with the aim of mobilizing voters. However, this effort did not produce the intended results, and the voices of the representatives of civil society were not heard. [10] Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude on the eve of the elections was that that the Moroccan electorate had acquired a significant degree of political consciousness and was ready for transparent democratic elections more than ever before.

THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE: A POSITIVE SIGN

The predictions of the results of the September 7, 2007 elections proved inaccurate and were certainly unexpected. For the first time in Morocco's electoral history, the results came as a surprise to all--the 50 foreign election observers, the 3,000 Moroccan observers, the public at large, and even the state. In the past, the elections had been "a sold game" (in the Moroccan context expressed as a match mabyu, or "c'est du cinema"). Yet the fact that the results were surprising was in fact a positive development. This was in fact "the first time that the Ministry of Interior published detailed results of an electoral campaign," reported Telquel.[11]

The era of fabricated elections results at the hands of the all-powerful minister of interior, Driss Basri, had passed. This time, it only took two days for the results to be announced. Contrary to all expectations, the winner was the Independence Party(Hizb al-Istiqlal)--the socially conservative, economically liberal, and historically nationalist party, known by its French initials as the IP.

The majority of observers who had predicted a landslide victory for the PJD in the 2007 elections based their analysis on two factors: First, unlike in 2002 when the PJD had been limited to running in only half of the constituencies, in 2007 the party was allowed representation in all constituencies. Second, on the eve of the elections, the zeitgeist both in the public sphere and in popular discourse was ostensibly in favor of the PJD.

In 2002, the USFP, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki li al-Quwwat al-Sha'bia) had won 50 seats, the IP 48, and the PJD 42.[12] In the 2007 elections, however, the IP won 52 seats; followed by the PJD, which secured only 46 seats; and the USFP, which came in third with 36 of the chamber's 325 seats. Also deserving mention were the MP, or Popular Movement (Haraka al-Sha'biyya) with 41seats, and the RNI, or National Rally of Independents (Tajammu al-Watani li al-Ahrar) with 39 seats; these two old parties have traditionally occupied fourth and fifth place, thus creating an interesting electoral fragmentation preventing a landslide victory by any party, no matter how popular it may be.

How can the results of the 2007 elections be explained? Why did the PJD, which had been expected to win 70 seats, fail to achieve an overwhelming victory? Why did the undefeatable USFP lose its popularity? How did the IP make such a comeback?

While it is too early to answer definitively, one speculation is that the PJD's proposed version of Islam frightens Moroccans. For example, due to what the PJD perceives as promiscuity, which is promoted by encounters between the sexes, it is openly hostile towards the popular yearly summer music and cultural festivals. Such festivities are the only opportunity for the majority of the Moroccans to enjoy themselves in a mixed sex forum without arousing suspicion. Moreover, admission is free of charge, an important factor considering that more than half of the population is under the age of 30, and over 50 percent of this particular sector is unemployed and/or does not have a bank account. Among this generation, the majority live with their parents until the age of 35 to 40. Moreover, youth--excluding a very small rich elite--do not go out on weekends. The situation for unmarried girls who have no choice but to live with their parents is even more complicated. If they are allowed to go out at all, they have a 6:00 p.m. curfew for fear of their safety after dark. For these "suffocated" youth, the July-August festivities are the only opportunity to socialize more or less freely. This is the only time of the year when young girls are permitted to stay out late and stand shoulder to shoulder with boys without breaching the public moral code.

By repeatedly conveying its opposition to these gatherings, the PJD both alienated many and revealed its ignorance of the basic principles of the art of governing: It demonstrated that it likely intended to rule through edicts forbidding or limiting social behavior and that it did not recognize the importance of permitting the population "to breathe" even once a year. The state, on the other hand, has apparently internalized this strategy. During the summer of 2007 there were many night festivals that were mainly, if not entirely, sponsored by the state.[13]

The new political map is most instructive in evaluating the situation.[14] It was predicted that if the PJD were to receive strong support in most of Morocco's big cities (Casablanca, Rabat, Salé, Tangier, and Meknès),[15] Marrakech would go with the Islamic party, as would other important urban centers. Unexpectedly, however, the PJD saw its worst results in the cities of Marrakech and al-Hoceima, both cities "notorious" for their summer night festivals. The income of the majority of the population in these cities comes from Western tourism, and the PJD wishes to limit such interactions with Westerners. The Attajdid newspaper, the organ of the PJD, frequently warns against the deterioration of mores in Marrakech stemming from sexual freedom and contact with the Western tourists.[16]

On the other hand, the USFP's version of Islam is equally threatening. Its secular orientation is a matter of concern for the majority of the people. Moreover, most of the leftist intellectuals who are partisans or sympathizers of the USFP express their vanguard ideas in a high academic language--either in French or literary Arabic--which is unintelligible for the average Moroccan. Moreover, their abstract ideas, for the most part, do not reach the masses, and if they do, they are perceived as too secular and sometimes even borderline atheist. Generally speaking, the socialist "theorists" of secularism are persona non grata in Morocco,[17] despite the fact that the practices of everyday life have a number of secular aspects.

THE ROAD TO THE PALACE

It seems that between the USFP's secularism and the PJD's Islamism, the IP has discovered the road leading directly to the palace. The IP's conservatism, nationalism, and most importantly, its affinity for the fundamental values of Islam intertwine with a "secular" way of living.[18] All of these factors give the impression that it is a well-balanced party, and thus it appeals to many. Its pragmatic attitude toward the celestial and the temporal is particularly suited to the world vision of the majority of Moroccans, and it complements their way of practicing Islam.

Since the colonial period, the IP has been deeply rooted in Morocco's religious and political landscape. It is associated in the Moroccan collective memory with liberation and freedom, as it was the IP (with the king's blessing) who led the country toward independence in 1956. It thus holds a special place in the hearts of Moroccans, especially among the older generation. Consequently, the IP won the majority of its votes not only in the rural areas of Doukala and Abda (an Arabic-speaking tribal region), but also in the Berber/Amazigh speaking areas--in Boulman and the region of Sous around Agadir, the Bastille of the Amazigh/Berber activists, traditional IP enemies. Most significant is the triumph in the Saharan cites, including Guelmima, Smara, Laayoune, Sakia al-Hamra, Oued al-Dahab, and Lagouira--the entire southern desert, from the region of Sous to the border with Mauritania.[19] The IP's victory in the Saharan cities is significant; there the tribes' leaders hold the founder of IP, Allal al-Fassi, in high esteem.[20] Abbas al-Fassi, leader of the IP, is Allal al-Fassi's son, and this resonates in the minds of the voters of the Sahara. Thus, the IP won most of its votes in the tribal and rural milieu, where propaganda is still strong and where democracy bends more to local rules than to the values of universal suffrage.

The IP has realized its "victory" in the regions where it has a strong historical clientele network of support and a traditional tribal system of commitments, loyalties, and reliance. It is conventional wisdom that in these regions one does not vote for an ideology but rather according to tribal affiliation. For some Moroccan intellectuals, the IP's comeback at the beginning of the twenty-first century is in fact a reaction, if not a regression, to the "Hassanian era."[21] The party reminds Moroccans of the alternance "reform" enacted by Hassan II in 1997, when in the name of democratization, the king coopted the two oppositionists parties, the USFP and the IP. He converted them into "governmental parties" (ahzab hukumiyya), thereby denying Moroccan citizens the allusion of a political opposition.[22] In light of this, considering the IP "victory" an achievement for Moroccan democracy is questionable.

BETWEEN VOTER TURNOUT AND BLANK BALLOTS

Perhaps the most significant factor of the 2007 parliamentary elections was the low voter turnout rate--among the lowest ever in Moroccan history.[23] Only 37 percent cast votes, of which 19 percent deposited blank ballots, or according to the Moroccan colloquial expression, "gave their voices [votes] to the wind." This meant that one in every five votes was in fact a blank ballot. The blank ballots combined with those who did not vote at all means that the overwhelming majority of voters did not express their political opinion. As Moroccan political scientist Abdallah Turabi so ironically put it, "if you add those who did not vote to those who cast blank ballots, they would form the biggest political party in the country."[24]

How can this phenomenon be explained? How can it be that in heyday of liberalization and democratization, Morocco is witnessing an overwhelming plague of depoliticization?[25]

Generally, in stable democracies the percentage of voter turnout is relatively low, as the citizens feel more or less satisfied with the political situation and trust that those voting will convey general opinion. In such a case, significant changes on the political map do not usually occur, and even if the government shifts its political orientation from left to right or vice versa, the general direction remains the same. In a healthy democracy, a low voter turnout is not necessarily a sign that the political establishment is in danger. In Morocco, however, this is not the case. Rather, in the young Moroccan democracy, this can only indicate a lack of democracy. Many observers, both within Morocco and abroad, believe that that the results of the last elections have again proven the existing gap between the people and state.[26]

The urban, educated, and unemployed in the 18 to 45 age range is a sector of potential voters with a political consciousness. In contrast to the peasants in the rural areas, a high percentage of this sector did not bother to vote on September 7, 2007. On the other hand, among this group, those who did go to the polling stations either cast empty ballots or most likely voted for the PJD or the USFP.

It this group of individuals--an integral part of the young Moroccan democracy--who boycotted the elections. Their casting of blank ballots and refusal to vote was an act of passive protest intended to penalize the regime and to express their general dissatisfaction. This is an urban middle-class that is not committed to rural notables, family alliances, or tribal loyalties. Had this middle class voted properly, or at all, one can only wonder if the outcome would have been different?

Those who voted for the PJD were most likely urban and middle class voters, a point that explains the PJD's showing in the election. Note that in Casablanca--the city where the majority of the middle-class of the country is concentrated--the PJD won about 70,000 votes, 20 percent of the total; the IP, the winner of the elections, was far behind with only 47,000 votes, 13 percent of overall votes.[27]

CONCLUSION

The election results have thus given the PJD "control" of the capital city of Rabat, the nearby city of Salé, and Casablanca, the country's economic center. In addition, it has come to dominate other important cites, including Tangiers--the gateway to Europe--and the region of Meknès-Tafilalet--where agriculture and tourism are concentrated.[28] The PJD cities--contrary to the villages and the frontier cities under IP control--are the country's economic and intellectual capitals. They constitute the stronghold of the PJD, which enjoys the support of both educated Moroccans and the residents of the bidonvilles (shantytowns).

The cities where the PJD prevailed are full of social conflicts. Both poverty and illiteracy exist there as well as a politically conscious urban educated youth. It is these youth, the possible future leaders of Morocco, who understand and respect the rules of the democratic game and who voted for the PJD. The Islamists' success among this sector is thus all the more significant. Moreover, while the PJD lost nationally, the party plays a significant role as an opposition force and thus does not run the risk of being coopted by the palace.

---

REFERENCES

[1] The notion of the lower chamber is relatively new, dating back to the series of reforms enacted by Hassan II from 1992 until the eve of his death in 1999. His efforts led to the constitutional amendments turning parliament into a bicameral body. In the old system, only two-thirds of seats were directly elected. Now the new lower chamber is chosen completely by the voters. For a survey and analysis of these reforms, see Mohamed Tozy, "De l'action clandestine au parlement: qui sont les islamistes au Maroc?," Le Monde Diplomatique (August 1999), http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/08/TOZY/12315.html. For a more detailed study of the royal reforms, see Abdeslam Maghrawoui's, "Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), pp. 73-86, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v012/12.1maghraoui.html.

[2] Latifa al-Arousni, "Ramadan in Morocco," al-Sharq al-Awsat,September 24, 2007, http://aawsat.com/english/print.asp?artid=id10306.

[3] "Maroc: la hausse du prix du pain annulée à la suite de manifestations populaires," Associated Press, September 25, 2007, http://www.emarrakech.info/Maroc-la-hausse-du-prix-du-pain-annulee-a-la-suite-de-manifestations-populaires_a12540.html.

[4] Adam Wade, "Grève du transport: Jettou soutient Ghellab, mais_," Aujourd'hui Le Maroc,April 4, 2007, http://www.aujourdhui.ma/thematiques-economiques-details53594.html.

[5] To view a video about the efforts of Moroccans living in France to participate in the Moroccan legislative elections from France, visit: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2xc5i_france24frreportageelectionaumaroc_politics.

[6] Christophe Ayad, "Les islamistes modérés sont donnés vainqueurs du scrutin de demain. Un exercice de démocratie borné par l'autorité de Mohammed VI," Libération (France), September 6, 2007, http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/monde/276593.FR.php; For more information on the subject, see: http://oeil-sur-la-planete.france2.fr/17196318-fr.php.

[7] According to street reports from Rabat and Casablanca. See Naoufel Daqaqi and Mawassi Lahsen, "Morocco's PJD Confident Despite Detractors," http//www.magharebia.com/.

[8] Mohamed El Hamraoui, "Elections du 7 Septembre du Maroc: bataille serrée pour les sièges," Le Reporter,March 2, 2007, http://www.lereporter.ma/article.php3?id_article=3285.

[9] "Limada Yuqati'una Intikhabat 2007 Daba?" ["Why Are They Boycotting the 2007 Elections Now?], Le Monde Amazigh, No. 86-87 (July-August 2007), p. 4.

[10] For the 2007 Daba association's efforts to increase political awareness among Moroccans, see: http://www.2007daba.com/.

[11] Driss Bennani and Karim Boukhari, "Spécial élections législatives. Les non-dits du scrutin," Telquel, No. 290 (September 22-28, 2007), http://www.telquel-online.com/290/maroc2_290.shtml.

[12] It should, however, be noted that in 2002, the PJD took third place, despite the fact that that the party was allowed to present candidates in only 55 of the 91 constituencies (dawa'ir intikhabiyya).

[13] For information on the music festivals, see a video report on the summer 2007 Casa Music Festival, at: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8tgy_bigg.

[14] See the new political map in Morocco after the 2007 election, at: http://www.telquel-online.com/290/images/schema.pdf.

[15] Contrary to the popular belief, the PJD is a middle-class party, not a party of the masses.

[16] Abed al-Rahman, al-Dawdi, "Taraju al-Siyyaha fi Murrakush" ["Degradation of Tourism in Marrakech"], Attajdid, No. 1754 (October 31, 2007), http://www.attajdid.ma/def.asp?codelangue=6&info=2&date_ar=2007/10/31.

[17] Driss Ksikes, "Religion : les derniers laïcs arabes," Telquel, No. 119 (March 20-26, 2004), http://www.telquel-online.com/119/sujet4.shtml.

[18] The IP is now officially declared a secular party.

[19] See the new political map in Morocco after the 2007 election, at: http://www.telquel-online.com/290/images/schema.pdf.

[20] He was one of the founding fathers of modern Morocco and the legendary nationalist who advocated the idea of "Grand Maroc" ("Greater Morocco"), which includes the Sahara and its inhabitants as an integral part of the territorial unity of the kingdom.

[21] Driss Bennani and Karim Boukhari, "Abbas premier minister. Aïe!," Telquel, No. 290 (September 2007), http://www.telquel-online.com/290/maroc2_290.shtml.

[22] For a good study of the alternance system enacted by King Hassan II, see Michal J. Willis, "Between Alternance and the Makhzan: At-Tawhid wa-al-Ihsan's Entry into Moroccan Politics," Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 45-80.

[23] For the official results of the elections, see the Ministry of Interior website, at: http://www.elections2007.gov.ma/.

[24] Cited in Bennani and Boukhari, "Spécial élections législatives."

[25] For an interesting attempt to answer this question, see an article by Moroccan political scientist Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Depoliticization in Morocco," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 24-32, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.4maghraoui.html.

[26] Francis Dubois, "Les élections au Maroc révèlent le gouffre existant entre le régime et la population," World Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/francais/News/2007/octobre07/111007_maroc.shtml.

[27] For further statistical details, see: http://www.elections2007.gov.ma/elu/clean/CandNomREG.aspx?s=1.

[28] See the new political map in Morocco after the 2007 election, at: http://www.telquel-online.com/290/images/schema.pdf. Samir Ben-Layashi is a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Historical Studies and a researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.

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Dubai Auto Show 2007

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Morocco: Overturn Verdicts for Homosexual Conduct

Convictions Violate Right to Privacy (New York, December 12, 2007) – The criminal verdicts in Morocco against six men sentenced to prison for homosexual conduct should be set aside and the men released, Human Rights Watch said today.

The court of first instance in Ksar el-Kbir, a small city about 120 kilometers south of Tangiers, convicted the men on December 10 of violating article 489 of Morocco’s penal code, which criminalizes “lewd or unnatural acts with an individual of the same sex.” According to lawyers for the defendants, the prosecution failed to present any evidence that the men actually had engaged in the prohibited conduct in the first place. “These men are behind bars for private acts between consenting adults that no government has any business criminalizing in the first place,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The men’s rights to privacy and freedom of expression have been violated, and the court has convicted them without apparent evidence; they should be set free.” The men have been in jail since they were first arrested by the police between November 23 and 25, 2007, after a video circulated online – including on YouTube – purporting to show a private party, allegedly including the men, taking place in Ksar el-Kbir on November 18. Press reports claimed the party was a “gay marriage.” Following the arrests, hundreds of men and women marched through the streets of Ksar el-Kbir, denouncing the men’s alleged actions and calling for their punishment. Abdelaziz Nouaydi, a Rabat lawyer on the men’s defense team, said that the judge convicted the men even though the prosecution presented no evidence showing that an act violating Article 489 had occurred and offered only the video as evidence. The video showed no indications of sexual activity. The men all pleaded innocent to offenses under the article, which has a statute of limitation of five years. At the trial, the judge refused to release the men provisionally pending their appeals. Criminalizing consensual, adult homosexual conduct violates human rights protection in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Morocco has ratified, bars interference with the right to privacy. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has condemned laws against consensual homosexual conduct as violations of the ICCPR. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has held that arrests for consensual homosexual conduct are, by definition, human rights violations. In the preamble to its constitution, Morocco “subscribes to the principles, rights, and obligations” consequent on its membership in organizations including the United Nations “and reaffirms its attachment to human rights as they are universally recognized.” The court sentenced three defendants to six months in prison and two defendants to four months; it sentenced the sixth, who it also convicted of the unauthorized sale of alcohol, to 10 months. The defendants range in age from 20 to 61 years old. In a private letter to Moroccan Justice Minister Abdelwahed Radi before the trial, Human Rights Watch urged the government to drop the charges and release the men. The letter also urged authorities to ensure the men’s physical safety, in light of the large and menacing mass demonstrations that took place against them. “In applying an unjust law in an unjust fashion, the Ksar el-Kbir court has fueled the forces of intolerance in Morocco,” said Whitson. “If Morocco truly aspires to be a regional leader on human rights, it should lead the way in decriminalizing homosexual conduct.” Article 489 of the Moroccan Penal Code punishes homosexual conduct with sentences between six months and three years in prison and fines of 120 to 1,200 dirhams (US $15 to $150).

Development threatens Morocco's wild shoreline

By Tom Pfeiffer
SAIDIA, Morocco (Reuters) - Ecologists say a tragedy is unfolding in north Africa where construction firms are moving in on some of the last unspoilt stretches of Mediterranean coastline in the search for profits.
With Spain trying to preserve what remains undeveloped on its built-up shoreline, Morocco has stepped forward as a willing host for large-scale tourism development as it seeks to narrow the north-south wealth divide and lift millions out of poverty.
The cost, say environment campaigners, will be irreparable damage to the Mediterranean's wilder southern shores where urban and industrial expansion, rampant pollution and illegal sand extraction are already taking their toll.
Morocco wants to attract millions of extra tourists to a chain of seaside resorts being built by Spanish, Belgian and Dutch consortia and U.S. groups Kerzner and Colony Capital.
The first is under way in Saidia on Morocco's eastern edge, where Spain's Fadesa is turning a low-lying area of forests and dunes into 7 million square meters of shops, golf courses, hotels with 17,000 beds and 3,100 villas and flats.
On its British Web site, Fadesa promises "landscaped parks and green areas, as well as pleasant public spaces, (will) harmonize with the beautiful natural surroundings."
At the development last month, machines lumbered over a landscape of earthworks, workers' shacks and the tattered remains of what campaigners say was Morocco's only juniper forest.
"We call them the destroyers," said local environment campaigner Najib Bachiri. "They dug up 6 km of dunes and killed thousands of tortoises just so you can see the sea from the corniche."
In a statement, Fadesa said it had "put in place measures for the protection, recuperation and regeneration of the environment beyond what was demanded by Moroccan law."
BEACHES RETREATING
Seven out of 47 of Morocco's Mediterranean beaches have disappeared in recent years, the European Environment Agency (EEA) said in a report last year. In Algeria, of between 250 and 300 km (160 and 190 miles) of sandy beaches, 85 percent were retreating and losing sand.
In valleys throughout the Maghreb, new dams for irrigation are trapping sediment that once washed down to coastal areas to bolster important wildlife habitats.
Wildlife groups said Fadesa was given carte blanche to destroy the dunes that protected Saidia's hinterland from the sea and flatten all but a small patch of forest.
"They could at least have left some of the trees for the golf courses, but even they were uprooted," said Mohamed Benata, head of regional development association ESCO.
Fadesa has said the Saidia project will create 8,000 direct jobs and more than 40,000 indirectly in a poor region cut off since 1994 when Algeria closed its land border with Morocco.
Tourism Ministry officials said they wanted each new resort to make use of the local environment to attract higher-spending visitors, adding that they had enforced the most widely used international standards for preserving the natural habitat.
Some observers say Morocco made a mistake in allowing Fadesa to build close to the Moulouya wetland, the country's most important reserve for more than 200 species of birds, and fear the worst, given plans for up to a million visitors every year.
"It's too close to the mouth of the river which has the richest ecosystem," said Alaoui El Kebir of the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) in Rabat.
Saidia's unique habitat drew life from water seeping through the sand and collecting in marshy areas. Fadesa has built channels and barriers to drain water away from the buildings.
"Fadesa say the work will dry about 5 percent of the wetland but our calculations show it'll be more like half," said Benata.
MIGRATING BIRDS
Without the wetland, a vital stepping stone for hundreds of millions of migrating birds would be removed.
The EEA says several north African wetlands are threatened, including Lake Bizerta in Tunisia, the salt lake of Regahaia in Algeria and 23rd of July Lake in Libya.
Bachiri accuses Fadesa of flouting local laws by pumping water from the Moulouya river. Lorries could be seen last month on the river bank loading up with salty water then returning to the work site.
A spokesman for Fadesa said the company had presented an environmental impact study when tendering for the project, which the Moroccan government had accepted, and had implemented steps to protect and improve the environment beyond that required by Moroccan law.
ESCO's Benata said mega-projects such as Saidia were out of fashion in Europe -- Spain had begun copying a strategy pioneered on the French Riviera to reclaim land, demolish buildings and regenerate the ecosystem.
Once the Saidia development is complete, Fadesa is likely to sell the site to management companies. Years down the line, however, nature may regain control.
"We produced a flooding scenario which shows most of the Fadesa complex could be under water by 2050 as global warming raises sea levels," said Maria Snoussi, earth sciences professor at Mohamed V University in Rabat.
(Additional reporting by Sarah Morris in Madrid; editing by Sara Ledwith and Andrew Dobbie)
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Edward Said, Fabricator and Plagiarist [Michael Rubin]

Did Edward Said Really Speak Truth to Power?
Edward Said's influence on academe looms even larger in death than during his life. On September 25, 2003, the day that he died, students and staff of Columbia University gathered in the garden outside Philosophy Hall, where the longtime professor of English and comparative literature had his office, for a candlelight vigil. It was the first of several memorials held in his honor on campuses across the United States, Asia, and Europe. Celebrity admirers, from novelist Salman Rushdie to actors Danny Glover and Vanessa Redgrave, joined a "huge crowd" at a March 2004 service in New York.[1] Almost four years later, Said's life is the subject of two documentaries—Charles Glass's Edward Said: The Last Interview and Sato Makoto's Out of Place. On May 25-26, 2007, Boğaziçi University in Istanbul held a major conference to provide revisionist luminaries including Israeli historian Ilan Pappé (now at the University of Exeter), British anti-Zionist academic Jacqueline Rose, and Said's former Columbia colleagues Joseph Massad and Rashid Khalidi an opportunity to "pay tribute, revisit, and engage with the richly variegated erudition and seminal scholarship" and "reflect critically on the location and significance of Said's intellectual legacy."[2] The conference not only examined Said's literary criticism—his professional field—and his writing on the Palestinians but also included a panel on "Said, the Public Intellectual Speaking Truth to Power." Lionizing Said as an intellectual warrior casting aside falsehood in a quest for truth regardless of consequence is a myth that may persist, but examination of his works suggests such popularity also reflects the triumph of politics over scholarship in the academy.

the full article is here
http://www.meforum.org/article/1811

The tasks of philosophy

The tasks of philosophy do not fluctuate, in any way, from one period to another. It is basically the origin of all sciences. When there is less concern to obtain wisdom, philosophy, therefore, would aid a lot to crack this issue by what it has to teach. This theory raises the questions: what are the principles that philosophy is supposed to teach? Why it ought to be considered? And to what extant it is related to liberated learned man?

Actually, the value that philosophy does, or should teach, is the interconnection between its partial relation to thoughts and its partial relation to feelings. Philosophy should broaden the rational imagination, and free the mentality from the chauvinisms of what are ordinary people. These people are those who identify only material needs, and those who depend only on food, to feed their stomach. Besides, the value of philosophy teaches that feeding the mind is just as significant as the body. It is exclusively the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be originated, and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can profit from the philosophical ideas.

Moreover, philosophy, which is the origin of all sciences, aims mainly to knowledge. It gives a way out door to separate our selves from the here and the now, from the moment and the space. Also, through the study of philosophy, it increases our awareness of comprehension, removes the stubbornness, and it keeps alive our sense of speculation by showing recognizable things in an unusual aspect. In addition, there is a widespread philosophical propensity towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that space, the moment, and the world of universals are properties of the mind. If there is anything not created by mind, it is unknown and of no accounts for us.

Up to this point, everything that depends upon a habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and therefore impairs the union which the intellect seeks. The intellectual will look at things from a perfection point of view. Out of moment and position and without hopes and fears, peacefully, for the sake of pure knowledge. Furthermore, free intellects will signify much more the abstract and universal knowledge, as such information, must be upon an limited and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they reveal.

In conclusion, Philosophy is meant to be studied, not for the sake of finding response, but for the sake of subjects themselves. These subjects expand our idea of what is probable, supplement our intellectual imagination and reduce the inflexible assurance which locks the intelligence next to hearsay.
Abdelmalik Essaadi University
Abdelkrim Amrani
English Study
S5

Veolia Morocco arm opens capital to institutions

RABAT, Dec 11 (Reuters) - The Moroccan arm of French utility group Veolia Environnement (VIE.PA: Quote, Profile, Research) opened its capital to two financial institutions on Tuesday, saying the move would underpin its development in the north African kingdom.
Fipar, a unit of Moroccan state investment vehicle Caisse de Depot et de Gestion, acquired 9 percent of Veolia Environnement Maroc, while AIG Infrastructure Fund took 10 percent, officials said at a signing ceremony in the Moroccan capital Rabat.
"Through this stake acquisition ... Veolia Environnement wishes to have by its side top-tier national and international institutional partners able to accompany its development," Veolia said in a statement distributed at the ceremony.
The deal was worth 494 million dirhams ($63.83 million), based on the nominal value of Veolia Environnement Maroc's 26.49 million shares.
The utility, which owns water and power concessions in the northern Moroccan towns of Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat and Sale, said its annual consolidated turnover was 4.4 billion dirhams and net profit was 85 million dirhams.
AIG Infrastructure Fund is managed by Emerging Capital partners, a private equity group which oversees investments across Africa. (Reporting by Tom Pfeiffer, editing by Richard Chang)

from this website :
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN1153027520071211

Women Call for More Sports Facilities

The Middle East's Leading English Language Daily Friday 7 December 2007 (27 Dhul Qa`dah 1428) Women Call for More Sports Facilities Najah Alosaimi, Arab News — RIYADH, 7 December 2007 — Despite dramatic advances in the number of women worldwide participating in sports, Saudi women remain unable to practice sports at an amateur level in the Kingdom. Some Saudi sports specialists believe that women are prevented from participating because of cultural attitudes — something that hampers the amount of support they are given. Dr. Rashid Al-Hamed, general director of the Saudi Tennis Federation, believes that if there were enough international level sports facilities accessible to women in the Kingdom then women could explore their physical potential, regardless of cultural barriers. “Currently businessmen are investing money in having sports facilities for the elite rather than for the less well-off,” said Al-Hamed, adding that the current situation of sports facilities hamper women from taking part in sports. Dr. Abdul Hameed Al-Masood of sports education at the Ministry of Education and general director of the Saudi Federation of Gymnastics Fund, said there are serious misconceptions about sports in the Kingdom. “The majority of Saudi women consider sports as something that only overweight people turn to in order to lose weight. Women need to be encouraged to involve themselves in sport activities and understand that sports are not only healthy but also entertaining, especially in our society where women have a limited entertainment outlet,” he said. Dr. Majedah Besar, a women’s activist, said: “We are in need of special committees to take the responsibility of encouraging women to participate in sports and promote respect for women and girls, who wish to practice sports according to Shariah law.” She added: “Saudi society still resents women doing sport. This is exacerbated by sporting organizations paying too little attention on this area.” She added that the committee should be responsible for funding sport facilities and organizing sport activities and tournaments for women. Women interviewed by Arab News expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of sports facilities for women in the Kingdom. They added that the facilities that are available are either of low quality, too expensive, or limited in the activities they hold. It is difficult to count the exact number of women’s clubs in the Kingdom. However, some people estimate there are 25 sports clubs in the Kingdom catering for women. Activities include fitness classes, spas and a few outdoor physical activities. In Riyadh, a city of five million, there are only three women’s sports clubs. In many sports centers around the world, members are entitled to enjoy all services. However, sports centers in the Kingdom charge membership fees and then separate fees to use facilities. Shayma Al-Utaibi, a 27-year-old teacher, registered herself at a leading sports center in Riyadh, paying SR780 to learn how to swim. Once she completes her course she will have to pay SR50 a day to use the pool. “Sports clubs in the Kingdom are very expensive and this is because women have no other alternative but to use the few venues, which are available and which monopolize charges,” said Al-Utaibi. Many women complained that sports clubs are inconveniently located far from urban areas. “It’s a big challenge getting to a club,” said Badriah, a 33-year-old Saudi mother. “Since I am not allowed to drive a car and most of the clubs are located too far from the city, I face a lot of difficulties. I have to ask my husband to take me around,” she said, adding that she often misses sports lessons. “If there were more clubs in residential areas, then women wouldn’t need to beg male family members to take them around,” she added. Other women expressed concern at the lack of facilities at sports centers. Rania Al-Karawi is a big fan of football and believes that this sport is not restricted to males. However, she is unable to play football anywhere. There are no clubs providing women with the chance to play football. “Almost all clubs offer a very limited range of sport,” she said, adding that her passion for football has never stopped. She still plays at home in the yard.

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Star DiCaprio lauded in Morocco

Star DiCaprio lauded in Morocco

Actor Leonardo DiCaprio has received an honorary award from director Martin Scorsese at the opening of the seventh Marrakesh Film Festival in Morocco.

Scorsese called the 33-year-old "a very good friend and wonderful actor" as he presented him with a Golden Star award.

"I never fail to be amazed by his clear and complete commitment to his work," said the Oscar-winning film-maker.

The actor, who has worked with Scorsese on three films to date, returned the compliment by calling him "a legend".

The pair are set to reunite next year for their fourth movie together, thriller Shutter Island.

Contribution

Moroccan director Mostafa Darkaoui was also awarded a Golden Star in recognition of his contribution to cinema in his homeland.

More than 100 films will be shown at this year's festival, which opened with a screening of period drama Elizabeth: The Golden Age.

Its director, India's Shekhar Kapur, sits on a jury headed by the Czech-born filmmaker Milos Forman.

The festival, which honoured Scorsese himself in 2005, runs until 15 December.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/entertainment/7134276.stm

Published: 2007/12/08 12:57:42 GMT

© BBC MMVII

from BBC

In Depth: The Kurdish Way

Foreign Exchange: Fareed Zackaria Talks with Qubad Talabany

Fareed Zakaria: As the situation in much of Iraq grows increasingly unstable and fractious, the semi-autonomous oil-rich Kurdish region in the north is an area of relative clam and prosperity. What will the disintegration of Iraq either by civil war or by design mean for the people and success of Iraqi Kurdistan? With us to discuss this is Qubad Talabany, the US Representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Qubad let me ask you; when one looks at Iraq right now it appears as though there is a level of sectarian violence and tension that is increasing day-by-day, week-by-week. In other words, the trend line is very much in the wrong direction; am I wrong?

Qubad Talabany: I don’t think you’re entirely wrong Fareed; the fact that Iraq really hasn’t developed a stable and sound and effective central government since the ousting of Saddam Hussein has really polarized the society where the different communities are feeling much more comfortable in being aligned with the political parties or their religious groups or the--the mosques of their affiliation and--and this has somewhat made it more difficult and has somewhat increased the tensions between the different sectarian and ethnic groups in the country.

Fareed Zakaria: Now you guys in Kurdistan squabbled a lot ten years ago and there were pitched battles and it seemed as though there was a kind of a minor low-grade civil war taking place in Kurdistan. What ended it?

Qubad Talabany: Well I think--and that’s--and I’m very glad that you raised this point because a lot of similarities can be pointed to what’s going on in the rest of Iraq at the moment. If--if you remember in ’91 we came down from the mountains; we encompassed this land called Kurdistan for the first time; we had been fighting for it for so long. With the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from that region we--we started to administer the region. It was a fledgling Administration that really didn’t have the political maturity to be able to sustain the coalition government that we formed, so there was a civil war that broke out between the two major political parties in Kurdistan and this war waged on for many years. It was only when we realized that we are missing a golden opportunity by fighting each other that--that we could miss out on the--on the great price of living within a federal democracy in a Saddam-free Iraq. The United States stepped in; they helped broker a peace between the two sides. It took many years even after that peace was broken for the trust to really develop between the two warring factions in--in Kurdistan. But today we’re seeing the byproduct of that intervention on the US part. We’re seeing a stable and prosperous Kurdistan region where the parties have their rivalries, have their differences, but have really put the majority of those differences aside, have unified ranks and are working together to really provide the best they can for the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Fareed Zakaria: All right; so now let’s look at the differences. You--there was no great sectarian difference. You were all Kurds. You lived under the shadow of US protection; that is to say that if the United States had withdrawn the no-flight zone. Saddam’s troops would have gone in and massacred you. You needed the stability because you needed money and you needed you know--whether it was all US aid or oil revenues. When I look at Iraq right now I see deep sectarian divisions. There is no sense that the United States is really effectively being able to protect anyone other than you know the people in the green zone and the feeling is that the oil revenues are there for them to take anyway; so--so the oil revenues have become part of the problem because they are the spoils which each side is vying for. That seems--sounds much more hopeless.

Qubad Talabany: The stakes are much higher in Iraq; the complications are greater. I think the regional interference is as much or possibly greater than it was in [inaudible] but what’s similar is--is the political immaturity that exists in Baghdad--that existed in Kurdistan--the ability to administer and govern effectively is what’s really lacking in--in Baghdad today.

Fareed Zakaria: And why was it--why was the United States able to broker that deal because God knows we’ve been trying to broker a deal in Baghdad. We--we tried push the--the Shia parties to make certain concessions; we’ve tried to push the Sunni groups to--to reach out to the insurgency and reign in the violence. Neither side is biting.

Qubad Talabany: The--the sides have to come to a realization that they will lose before they can actually come to the table and sit down and negotiate. We came to that realization in Kurdistan. We realized that we were going to lose a golden opportunity and so we did; we put our differences aside and--and albeit there weren't the--the kinds of divisions that we’re seeing in Iraq today. There were a lot of tensions that did go back for several decades between the two--the two main parties. What we--what we’re seeing in Iraq is very unfortunate and tragic but to--if we can look at the complications the problems of Iraq today are not today’s problems. They’re problems of hundreds if not a thousand or so years ago that we’re seeing turn into reality in Iraq today and it’s coming to a realization that the complexity of the situation in Iraq and the deep sectarian and--and ethnic division that exists in Iraq makes it very difficult for us to come up with a blanket policy that will please the Sunnis, please the Shiites, please the Kurds--at the same time.

Fareed Zakaria: Everybody agrees that the only way you’re going to get a--some succession or--or diminution of the violence is some kind of a political deal. Everybody knows what the political deal is going to have to look like--substantial autonomy for the regions, some sharing of the oil revenues, some kind of amnesty so that everyone involved in the killings can be rehabilitated; there is no indication that there is much movement on these issues--yes, one or two laws pass here and there but a substantial national reconciliation on the lines of a South Africa or something like that seems nowhere in the cards. How do we get from here to there?

Qubad Talabany: Well first and foremost the violence has to stop. It’s--it’s going to be very difficult to carry out a--a national reconciliation, a truth in reconciliation plan as in--as in what happened in South Africa while there is a war going on, while there is the blood-letting and the violence that we’re seeing today in the country. And again this comes back to the ability of the leadership in Iraq, the leadership of the different communities, the leadership of the different tribes and of the religious groups to be able to be held accountable for the actions of their--.

Fareed Zakaria: But how do you stop the violence? People are trying and it’s decentralized at this point and as you pointed out the--the weaker the Iraqi state the more people withdraw to these local regional militias; in fact sometimes to just street gangs. There are reports now that in places like Basra you--it’s--it’s--people are pledging their allegiance to you know--to almost neighborhood by neighborhood militias. How on earth do you stop this?

Qubad Talabany: Well there’s--I don’t really have the answer to that to be honest with you, Fareed. I’ve been--I’ve--

Fareed Zakaria: If you did you’d be in Baghdad. [Laughs]

Qubad Talabany: I’d be you know a lot happier and I think the world would be a lot safer but we have to come to the realization that today Baghdad is the prize which is why everybody is fighting for Baghdad. If we reduce that prize and the importance of that prize and--and give people a stake in governing their own affairs, their own regions, their--their own territories, where they can raise their own local police and law enforcement units, without the imposition of Baghdad then I think we--we have a much better chance of success. I’m not saying that--that will be easy because we have to overcome corruption, nepotism, and--and warlord(ism) in the region.

Fareed Zakaria: Now this is--this sort of plays into a certain Kurdish agenda which is of course to have a strong--stronger local and regional grouping, which may be inevitable, it may be the way of the future but does it not produce an intractable problem which is that the Sunni will not stop fighting unless there is a deal on oil revenues because under your plan it all sounds nice except that the Sunnis get no oil, right. And so unless you have some deal in place devolving power to the--to the regions will insure that one of these three groups--the Sunnis will fight to the bitter end because they know what--what that will mean in the absence of an oil--oil revenue sharing deal.

Qubad Talabany: I have to disagree with you there, Fareed because our deal includes the Sunnis in--in them receiving their fair share of the oil revenues. We have to come up with the real deal that needs to be made is coming up with a formula with a mechanism that equitably distributes the oil revenues of the country.

Fareed Zakaria: Right; but that--and that the Sunnis do not trust is in place.

Qubad Talabany: They do not trust at this point and they won't trust with--with a centralized government in Baghdad. There has to be a lot of international involvement whether it’s World Bank oversight or--or some other international body to oversee the distribution of Iraq’s oil revenues to make sure that--that it’s not based on--that it’s based on a per-capita and a proportionate system that makes people feel assured. At the moment, insecurities are high; everyone is insecure. The Sunnis are insecure, the Shias are insecure--.

Fareed Zakaria: But this is auditory again--how do we make it happen? Why is that what you’re describing which is eminently sensible is not something that--that the Shia majority in Parliament will accept?

Qubad Talabany: We have to get them to understand; we have to--again it comes back to political maturity and we--I don’t know how we do it but--but the--the less insecure they get the more--the more all sides will realize that we can come up with a framework. There is enough oil to be distributed in this country and this is what we have to continue to--to let people know; this country is a potentially very rich and powerful country and there is enough to go around to make the Sunnis happy, to make the Kurds happy, to make the Shiites happy but what we need is a mechanism in place and the mechanism has to be an Iraqi mechanism with a lot of international oversight to give people the security and--and the guarantees that it will be managed effectively.

Fareed Zakaria: All right; if all this doesn’t happen do you want American troops in Kurdistan--your--the President of Iraq who is a Kurd who also happens to be your father has said publicly for the first time in the last few months that he would welcome American--an American base; is that a formal offer to the United States?

Qubad Talabany: We’ve constantly offered this to the United States formally and informally. We think that--that having the American troops in the Kurdistan region will--will serve the United States. It’s--it’s the one part of--of the Middle East I would say--certainly of Iraq--that is overwhelmingly pro-American--that wants American troops there.

Fareed Zakaria: Probably Bush--I think of it as one place that Bush would have done well in this last election is if he had gotten votes in Kurdistan.

Qubad Talabany: [Laughs] Well we--people are grateful to the President because he led this effort to liberate us and to oust Saddam and I think that’s--that’s very recognizable.

Fareed Zakaria: Do you think it will happen?

Qubad Talabany: Do I think the Americans will have troops in Iraq--in Kurdistan? I think it will; I think it will be--it will be a mistake for them not to take up this offer.

Fareed Zakaria: All right; if we’re going to protect the shining example of--of modernity and democracy do you think that the situation in Kurdistan in terms of democracy and openness is going to get better? Right now the place runs as essentially two one-party [states] carved out and to be--to--to prosper in either part of the--Kurdistan you have to belong, you have to have political allegiance to one of the two parties--one of which you represent. That’s--one hopes that it--Kurdistan is going to get more democratic than that.

Qubad Talabany: Right; and--and we’re constantly trying to democratize the Kurdistan region. And this is why we need American involvement to help us along this way. We have done very well to come from where we did in ’92 to where we are today--where we have a unified Kurdistan regional government where both political parties are fully engaged and the Cabinet Ministries are--it’s a coalition government in the Kurdistan region but we have to increase our level of civil society, improve on our level of civic education and really open our society up a lot more. We--we are an example when you compare us to the rest of Iraq but if you compare us to Europe and other places we have a long way to go. And we understand that and our leadership understands that which is why we think it would be a travesty if there was a premature withdrawal from Iraq and there was no guarantees to protect the--the really developing civil society in the Kurdistan region. Here is a region in the heart of the Islamic Middle East that has a real semblance of hope; we--we jokingly say because of and despite of US foreign policy we are where are today and--and we really urge that--that people not lose sight of what’s emerging in Kurdistan. Instead of leaving us to our own devices help us to turn into a fully functioning democracy and I think the will on the part of the leadership of Kurdistan is there. We just need to partner with the United States and with others in the international community to help us get there.

Fareed Zakaria: Qubad Talabany, thank you very much.

Qubad Talabany: Thank you, Fareed.

the original site is http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc120107FZ.html
We have copied this interview from there

Moroccan hopes dashed of hosting 2012 World Expo

The suspense is over: Tangier will not be hosting the 2012 World Expo. The final decision, which put an end to Morocco's hopes, was announced at 9pm on Monday (November 26th) in Paris. After months of campaigning to win the bid, Morocco lost out to a strong rival – South Korea. When the 140 member states of the International Exhibitions Bureau held a secret ballot at the organisation’s 42nd General Assembly, Yeosu won 77 votes, beating Tangier’s 63. The third bidder, Poland, had been eliminated in the first round after receiving only 13 votes.

The Moroccan delegation said Morocco had sought the World Expo not only for itself but also for the whole of Africa, the Mediterranean region and the Arab and Muslim world. Member Abdellatif Benazzi said the country mounted an exemplary campaign. "Morocco presented a vision of a future where individuals are at the heart of the development process. We believed in our values," he said.

Moroccan Communications Minister Khalid Nasiri expressed his bitter disappointment, saying that Morocco made a very credible effort and did all it could in the face of strong competition. "I feel my country has suffered an injustice. Morocco put in an outstanding bid; all those who watched the three presentations objectively believed Morocco’s was by far the most original and had the most spirit," he said.

Morocco still has every reason to be proud, Nasiri noted. "Plans to develop the northern region and the rest of the country will continue, with or without the Tangier Expo. These plans will support our nation and our principles. Whatever the outcome may have been, Morocco has come away from this with its head held high. Our cities will continue to develop," he declared.

Although Tangier residents seem equally confident that development of their region will continue, they were disappointed to learn their home city will not host the World Expo. Medical student Hakima Hachimi said the city’s inhabitants really believed in Tangier’s chances and never doubted that victory would be theirs.

"Morocco’s bid was a cultural one. It would have been the first African and Arab country to host a World Expo. The theme 'World highways, cultural crossroads: for a more united world' was closely linked to Morocco’s identity as a nation of sharing, tolerance and cohabitation of cultures and civilisations. It’s a real shame," Hachimi lamented.

Teacher Salim Moha was more optimistic: "Sure, the Expo would have boosted the country’s economy further, but the north will continue to develop – as you can see from projects such as the Tanger-Méditerranée port."

This content was commissioned for Magharebia.com.